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75 percent of the trust.16  Accordingly, 75 percent of the gain
on the residence was excludible.17  A late 1982 private letter
ruling18 involved a revocable inter vivos trust.  The grantor
requested a ruling as to whether transfer of the title to the
residence (which was community property) to the trust would
disqualify the grantor from the exclusion for the gain.
Because the grantors had reserved the power to revoke the
trust, the grantors were treated as the owners of the entire
trust.19  Thus, the grantors were not disqualified from
claiming the exclusion on sale of the residence.20  The ruling
specified, however, that the ruling was “strictly limited to the
period of time in which both…are alive, neither…becomes
subject to a judicial determination of incompetence, and [the
grantor] may fully exercise the power to revoke [their]
respective interests in the trust.”21
More recent authority
A 1998 private letter ruling, involving a revocable inter
vivos trust, allowed the exclusion on the sale of the residence
owned by the trust.22
In an early 2000 private letter ruling,23 the only asset held
by a trust was the taxpayer’s residence.  The taxpayer was the
income beneficiary of the trust, established by the taxpayer’s
parent.  The taxpayer was currently living in an assisted care
facility and the trustee was planning to either lease or sell the
residence.  The taxpayer had no power over trust corpus or
discretionary authority to distribute trust corpus.  The ruling
holds that the taxpayer was not deemed to be the owner of the
trust.  Therefore, the trustee could not exclude any gain from
the sale of the residence from trust income.24
In conclusion
It is clear from the rulings to date, that, to the extent the
grantor or beneficiary has sufficient authority over the trust or
trust property to require that the grantor or beneficiary be
considered the owner of the trust, such portion of the gain on
the residence is excludible from income.25  That suggests
careful planning attention on whether the residence should be
placed in trust and the powers exercisable over the trust and
over trust property by the grantor or beneficiary. Indeed, it
suggests that it may be wise to place the residence in the
marital trust for that reason.
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CASES, REGULATIONS AND STATUTES
by Robert P. Achenbach, Jr.
BANKRUPTCY
FEDERAL TAX     -ALM § 13.03[7].*
POST-PETITION INTEREST . The IRS filed a claim
for nondischargeable taxes in the debtor’s Chapter 11 case.
The plan provided for full payment of the claim, but as
required by Section 502(b)(2), no provision was made for
payment of post-petition and pre-confirmation interest (so-
called gap interest). The court held that the debtor was
personally liable for the gap interest because (1) Section
502(b)(2) prevented the bankruptcy estate from paying that
interest; (2) because the interest was not a liability of the
estate, the plan did not estop the IRS from collecting the
interest from the debtor; and (3) the underlying tax was
nondischargeable so the gap interest was nondischargeable.
In re Stacy, 2000-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,481
(Bankr. W.D. Va. 2000).
TAX LIEN . The debtor was married but filed for Chapter
13 separately. The debtor and spouse filed a joint income
t x retu n for 1994 and the IRS filed a claim for taxes owed
for that year. The IRS filed a notice of tax lien for the 1994
taxes and the issue was whether the lien included the value
of the debtor’s entire residence or only the debtor’s interest
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in the property. The residence was owned by the couple as
tenants by the entirety. The court held that, because the
1994 return was filed jointly, the taxes were a joint debt of
the couple and subjected the entire residence to the tax lien,
even though only the debtor filed for bankruptcy. In re
O’Gorman-Sykes, 245 B.R. 815 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1999)
VALUATION . The Chapter 13 debtor was the sole
shareholder of a corporation which operated a delivery
service. The debtor was the primary contact between the
company and its clients who used the company’s services
out of loyalty to the debtor. The debtor’s plan provided for
the continued operation of the company with plan payments
made from the debtor’s disposable income. The IRS had
filed a tax lien against the corporation’s stock and the issue
was the value of that stock for purposes of determining the
secured portion of the IRS claim. The IRS argued that the
stock should be valued based upon the income of the
corporation and the goodwill. The debtor argued that the
value of the corporation should be determined using the
liquidation value of the business with no value for goodwill
because the business was dependent upon the services of
the debtor. The court held that the income of the
corporation was relevant to the value of the corporation
because the debtor was going to continue the business. The
court also held that, although the debtor’s services to the
business were important, the nature of the debtor’s services
did not involve the type of specialized skill or judgment
that was so individualized that it could not be performed by
another person; therefore, the goodwill of the company had
value independent of the debtor’s services and increased the
value of the company. I  re Thomas, 246 B.R. 500 (E.D.
Pa. 2000), aff’g, 231 B.R. 581 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1999).
CONTRACTS
HEDGE-TO-ARRIVE CONTRACTS. The plaintiff
cooperative and defendant grain farmer had been doing
business for many years, using many types of grain
transactions, including grain forward contracts. In 1991
through 1996, the parties entered into several hedge-to-
arrive (HTA) contracts for corn and soybeans, usually with
no problems because the defendant used the contracts for
only a small portion of the total harvest, grain prices did not
fluctuate much during the contracts, and the defendant
usually delivered during the first year. However, in 1995,
the parties entered into large, three year HTA contracts and
during the contracts, the price of corn increased above the
contract price. In addition, the defendant’s production was
insufficient to meet the contract amounts and the defendant
sought to roll over the contracts to later production years.
When the contract and current corn prices became too
divergent, the plaintiff sent a letter to the defendant which
indicated that the plaintiff wanted to terminate the contracts
with delivery of the grain by the defendant. The defendant
responded in writing that the defendant was repudiating the
contracts unless the contracts were later found to be
enforceable, in which case the defendant would continue to
perform under the contracts. The plaintiff then demanded
adequate assurance that the defendant would deliver the
rn in the contracts. The defendant had sought clarification
of th erms of the contract and refused to promise delivery
until h se terms were settled. However, the defendant
made written assurance that, if the contracts were held to be
enforceable, the defendant would perform on the contracts.
The plaintiff canceled the contracts and brought suit for
anticipatory breach of contract. The trial court had held that
the defendant’s repudiation of the contract was reasonable
grounds for insecurity sufficient to require adequate
assurance but also held that, given the history of the
defendant to perform on contracts, the defendant’s written
promise to perform was adequate assurance. Therefore, the
trial court held that the plaintiff’s cancellation of the
contract was a breach of contract and precluded the
plaintiff’s recovery of any damages on the contract. See
also Harl, “Adequate Assurance in Contracts,” 9 Agric. L.
Dig. 41 (1998). On appeal the Iowa Supreme Court
reversed, holding that the defendant’s written assurances
were insufficient because the condition of performance,
judicial review of the contract, was not possible within 30
days and was not part of the original contract; therefore, the
plaintiff’s repudiation was not a breach of the contract.
Land O’Lakes, Inc. v. Hanig, No. 50/98-1370 (Iowa
April 26, 2000).
FEDERAL AGRICULTURAL
PROGRAMS
CROP INSURANCE.  The Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia has upheld a ruling that national banks
may not sell crop insurance unless they meet the
requirements fo the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, Pub. L. No.
106-102, §§ 103(a), 121, 113 Stat. 1338 (1999). An article
by Dr. Harl will appear in an upcoming issue of the Digest.
Independent Ins. Agents of Am., Inc. v. Hawke, No. 99-
5158 (D.C. Cir. May 16, 2000), aff’g,  43 F. Supp. 2d 21
(D.D.C. 1999).
EGGS. The AMS has adopted as final regulations
amending the voluntary shell egg grading program by
adding a definition of the term “ambient temperature,” by
amending the refrigeration requirements, and by adding a
labeling requirement. 65 Fed. Reg. 34569 (May 31, 2000).
FARM CREDIT ADMINISTRATION . The FCA has
adopted as final regulations which provide that a Farm
Credit bank or association will no longer need approval
f om other system institutions when it buys participations in
loans from non-system lenders. 65 Fed. Reg. 33743 (May
25, 2000).
MEAT AND POULTRY INSPECTION . The FSIS has
adopted as final regulations removing the  remaining
requirements pertaining to partial quality control (PQC)
programs. A PQC program controls a single product,
operation, or part  of an operation in a meat or poultry
establishment. The final regulations remove  the design
requirem nts for PQC programs and the requirements for
establishments to have PQC programs for certain products
or processes. 65 Fed. Reg. 34381 (May 30, 2000).
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TUBERCULOSIS .   The APHIS has extended to June
16, 2000, the comment period for proposed regulations
which amend the bovine tuberculosis requirements to
establish several new levels of tuberculosis risk
classifications to be applied to states. The amendments
would also add goats to the animals covered by the
regulations and increase the amount of testing which must
be done before the animals may be moved in interstate
commerce. 65 Fed. Reg. 34598 (May 31, 2000).
FEDERAL ESTATE
AND GIFT TAX
PROPOSED LEGISLATION . Legislation has been
introduced in the U.S. House of Representatives that would
increase from 15 to 75 the number of partners or
shareholders in a business which qualified for the closely-
held business definition for purposes of qualifying an estate
for installment payment of estate tax. H.R. 4512.
ALTERNATE VALUATION DATE . The decedent’s
estate filed an estate tax return but did not make the I.R.C. §
2032 alternate valuation election. Less than one year after
the original return was due, the estate filed a supplemental
estate tax return which included an alternate valuation
election and sufficient supporting information. The use of
the alternate valuation date decreased the value of the
estate. The IRS allowed an extension for the late filed
election. Ltr. Rul. 200021021, Feb. 18, 2000.
ANNUITY . The decedent had owned four parcels of
farmland which were originally intended to pass to the
decedent’s grandchildren by testamentary bequest. The
decedent decided, however, to sell the parcels to the
grandchildren in exchange for an annuity. The decedent
executed the documents for the transfer prior to April 30,
1989 (the effective date of I.R.C. § 7520) but title did not
pass until after that date when the grandchildren signed the
annuity agreement. The decedent’s accountant valued the
annuity using tables which were not effective under Section
7520 and used too low an interest rate, whereas the
accountant should have used the procedures in Notice 89-
24, 1989-1 C.B. 660. As a result the annuity amount was
too low to make the value of the annuity equal the fair
market value of the farmland transferred. The court held
that the difference between the fair market value of the
farmland and the value of the annuity was a taxable gift
from the decedent. As part of the transfer, the decedent
required the grandchildren to contribute their interests in
the land to a family partnership which provided that other
partners would have a first option to purchase any interest
in the land to be sold. The estate argued that the partnership
arrangement made the transfer a business transaction
exempt from the gift tax. The court held that the transfer
was not a business transaction because no arm’s-length
negotiations took place to determine the details of the
transfer. The appelate court affirmed in a decision
designated as not for publication. Est. of Cullison v.
Comm’r, 2000-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 60,376 (9th Cir.
2000), aff’g, T.C. Memo. 1998-216.
INSTALLMENT PAYMENT OF ESTATE TAX . The
decedent owned an interest in a shopping center which was
passed to an heir who owned the remaining interest. Most
of the estate was liquidated to pay estate taxes but the estate
made an election to pay the remainder of the estate taxes in
installments. The heir discovered that the shopping center
could not obtain an operation line of credit with the estate
tax paid in installments. The heir obtained a private loan for
payment of the estate taxes in full. The loan had a provision
prohibiting prepayment and the estate agreed not to claim
any interest expenses as an estate tax deduction until the
interest was actually paid on the loan. The IRS ruled that
the loan benefited the estate sufficiently for the interest to
be an administrative expense of the estate. The IRS ruled
that the interest on the loan was deductible as an estate
administrative expense so long as the interest was actually
paid. Ltr. Rul. 20002011, Feb. 15, 2000.
SPECIAL USE VALUATION- ALM § 5.03[2].* The
IRS has issued the 2000 list of average annual effective
interest rates charged on new loans by the Farm Credit
Bank system to be used in computing the value of real
property for special use valuation purposes:
District      Interest rate   
Columbia 9.82
Om ha/Spokane 8.10
Sacramento 8.06
St. Paul 8.26
Springfield 8.93
Texas 8.19
Wichita 8.18
Rev. Rul. 2000-20, I.R.B. 2000-__.
FEDERAL INCOME
TAXATION
PROPOSED LEGISLATION. Legislation has been
introduced in the U.S. House of Representatives that would
allow a tax credit of up to $30,000 for “qualified value-
added agricultural property” placed in service in the tax
year. Qualified value-added agricultural property is defined
as depreciable property with a useful life of three years or
more “which is used to add value to a good or product,
suitable for food or nonfood use, derived in whole or in part
from organic matter which is available on a renewable
basis, including agricultural crops and agricultural wastes
and residues, wood wastes and residues, and domesticated
animal wastes.”  The credit is limited to persons who
materially participate in the farming business. For
p rtnerships, S corporations and cooperatives, the material
participation test is applied at the member level. H.R. 4497.
ACCOUNTING METHOD . The taxpayer was a
corporation which leased port facilities from a city. As part
of the lease arrangement, the city issued industrial
development bonds to finance part of the renovation of the
facilities. The bonds were paid from increased rent charged
to the taxpayer. The taxpayer originally treated these rent
payments as true rent and deducted the payments as
business rent expenses. The taxpayer decided that the lease
payments for the renovations were actually principal and
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interest and the renovations were assets owned by the
taxpayer. Thus, the taxpayer argued that it should be
allowed to claim depreciation on the renovation assets. The
IRS argued that the change was a change in accounting
method which required prior consent of the Commissioner.
The taxpayer argued that the original characterization of the
payments as rent was erroneous; therefore, no consent was
required to change the characterization to the proper one.
The court held that the recharacterization of the payment
was a change in accounting method which required prior
consent from the IRS. Cargill Incorporated v. United
States, 91 F. Supp.2d 1293 (D. Minn. 2000)
BAD DEBT DEDUCTION. The U.S. Supreme Court
has denied certiorari in the following case. The taxpayer
had loaned funds to a solely-owned corporation. The
taxpayer claimed the loans as bad debts on income tax
returns for 1988 and 1989 and the bad debt deductions
offset gains realized from the sale of stock in another
corporation. However, after 1988, the taxpayer’s
corporation continued to do business and even made a
public offering of stock. The court held that the loans were
not shown to be worthless in 1988 or 1989 and disallowed
the bad debt deductions. The appellate court affirmed in a
decision designated as not for publication. Cobor  v.
Comm’r, , 2000-1, U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,132 (8th
Cir. 1999), aff’g, T.C. Memo. 1998-377.
The taxpayer orally contracted with a carpenter to build
three residential properties. The carpenter had no other
source of money or loans from the projects. The contract
provided for the taxpayer to advance money for the project
in increments with a consulting fee and the advances to be
paid to the taxpayer from the sale proceeds. The carpenter
filed for bankruptcy, the properties were foreclosed upon
and the taxpayer was not repaid. The court held that the
taxpayer could not deduct the advanced funds as a bad debt
because the advances were more in the nature of
investments because (1) there was no written loan
agreement; (2) there was no fixed maturity date since the
repayment was to be made only when the properties sold;
(3) the repayment was to be made from the sale profits; (4)
the taxpayer could not enforce repayment until he
properties sold; (5) the consulting fee indicated a joint
venture; and (6) the carpenter never made any repayment.
Provost v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2000-177.
C CORPORATIONS-ALM  § 7.02[2].*
ACCOUNTING METHOD. The taxpayer was a
corporation which sold seed, herbicide, fertilizer, farm
equipment and other farming supplies to farmers. The
corporation used the cash method of accounting for tax
purposes. The corporation was owned by one person who
carried the business far beyond the mere selling of
merchandise. The owner provided financial and other help
to area farmers, often borrowing money to help the farmers
meet their supply needs. The corporation allowed the
purchasing of supplies on credit and had substantial income
from interest charged on the loans and credit purchases.
Testimony of several farmers demonstrated that the owner’s
efforts were crucial to the survival of several farming
operations in the area. The corporation did not own any
farm land nor did it raise any crops or livestock. The
corporation had gross income of over $3 million in the tax
years at issue. The IRS argued that the corporation was
required to use the accrual method of accounting and
maintain inventories. The court held that the corporation
had to use inventories and the accrual method of accounting
because the sale of merchandise was a substantial income
producing factor in the business. The court also held that
the corporation was not a farmer eligible for the cash
method of accounting because the corporation was not
directly involving in any farming activity. The corporation
argued that it was involved in farming because it bore the
risk of farming activities through the loans to farmers and
the credit purchases. The court found, however, that most
of the loans and credit purchases were secured. The court
also noted that the taxable income of the corporation was
substantially different under the two methods of
accounting, with the accrual method more closely reflecting
actual i come. The appellate court affirmed in a decision
designated as not for publication. Ward Ag Products, Inc.
v. Comm’r, 2000-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,487 (11th
Cir. 2000), aff’g, T.C. Memo. 1998-84.
CONSTRUCTIVE DIVIDENDS. The taxpayer was the
sole owner of a corporation which operated a delivery
business. The taxpayer personally cashed some of the
checks from clients and did not report the checks as income
to t e corporation or to the taxpayer. The taxpayer claimed
that the money from these checks was paid to casual
laborers but provided no evidence to support these
payments. The taxpayer also failed to provide any evidence
that the corporation did not have sufficient income to make
dividend payments. The court held that the money from the
cashed checks was a constructive dividend to the taxpayer.
The opinion is designated as not for publication. AJF
Trans ortation Consultants, Inc. v. Comm’r, 2000-1
U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,473 (2d Cir. 2000).
REORGANIZATIONS. The IRS has adopted as final
regulations which provide that prior ownership of a portion
of a t rget corporation's stock by an acquiring corporation
ge erally will not prevent the “solely for voting stock”
equirement in a “Type C” reorganization of the target
corporation and the acquiring corporation from being
satisfied. 65 Fed. Reg. 31805 (May 19, 2000).
COURT AWARDS AND SETTLEMENTS-ALM §
4.02[14]. The taxpayer had filed a suit against the
taxpayer’s former employer under the federal Age
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967. The parties
reached a settlement and the taxpayer received payment to a
trust account held by the taxpayer’s attorney. The attorney
retained the portion for the legal fees and paid the
remainder to the taxpayer. The taxpayer included only the
amount received from the attorney trust account in income.
The court held that the entire settlement payment was
included in the taxpayer’s income with the taxpayer entitled
to an itemized deduction for the legal fee retained by the
attorney. Kenseth v. Comm’r, 114 T.C. No. 26 (2000).
The taxpayer was a tenured professor at a university. The
taxp y r filed an age discrimination suit under the federal
Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 and state
anti-discrimination law against the university in which the
jury returned a verdict for the university. During the appeal,
the parties negotiated a settlement for $350,000 and the
resign tion of the taxpayer from the university. The court
86 Agricultural Law Digest
*Agricultural Law Manual (ALM).
found that the settlement proceeds were paid by the
university in exchange for the taxpayer’s resignation and in
order to decrease the costs of further litigation and not to
compensate the taxpayer for personal injuries; therefore,
none of the proceeds was excludible from the taxpayer’s
gross income. Reisman v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2000-
173.
The taxpayer owned property neighboring a petroleum
processing plant. The taxpayer complained about the odors
and appearance of the plant and the plant owners agreed to
purchase the taxpayer’s property for cash and 450 acres of
property elsewhere. The taxpayer signed a release of all
claims against the plant owners. The court held that, under
Texas law, an action for emotional harm could not result
from the lawful operation of the plant. The court also held
that the taxpayer had not made any claim in tort for
personal harm but that the proceeds were paid in
compensation for the property rights transferred to the plant
owners; therefore, the proceeds were included in the
taxpayer’s gross income to the extent they exceeded the
taxpayer’s basis in the property. Holland v. United States,
2000-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,465 (S.D. Texas 2000).
DEPRECIATION. The taxpayer owned a ski resort
located on public land. The taxpayer incurred costs for
clearing land; grading mountain roads, trails and slopes;
and surfacing roads and trails. The IRS ruled, subject to
further factual development, that the costs for clearing land
and grading the roads, trails and slopes were not
depreciable. The IRS also ruled that the costs of surfacing
the roads and trails were depreciable over 15 years. FSA
Ltr. Rul. 200021013, Feb. 17, 2000.
This case involved seven cattle breeding partnerships
formed by one organization. The organization originally
owned or purchased cattle and resold the cattle to the
partnerships in return for recourse promissory notes.
However, the court found that many of the cattle sales were
fictitious, the amounts “paid” for the cattle often exceeded
the fair market value of the cattle, and the organization did
not enforce the recourse nature of the notes. The court held
that the partnerships failed to substantiate ownership of the
cattle, the validity of the notes and the cost basis of the
cattle; therefore, the partnerships were not allowed
depreciation deductions for the cattle. Durham Farms #1
v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2000-159.
DISCHARGE OF INDEBTEDNESS. The taxpayer was
an S corporation which owned an interest in a partnership
which had discharge of indebtedness income from
reduction of a loan involving qualified real property
business indebtedness. The taxpayer’s return preparer failed
to make the I.R.C. § 108(c)(3)(C) election to reduce basis
of depreciable assets and the taxpayer sought an extension
of time to file the election. The IRS granted the extension.
Ltr. Rul. 200021014, Feb. 17, 2000.
DISASTER PAYMENTS . On May 12, 2000, the
president determined that certain areas in Missouri are
eligible for assistance under the Disaster Relief and
Emergency Assistance Act, 42 U.S.C. § 5121, as a result of
severe storms and flooding on May 6-7, 2000. FEMA-
1328-DR. On May 13, 2000, the President determined that
certain areas in New Mexico are eligible for assistance
under the Act as a result of a severe forest fire beginning on
Ma 5, 2000. FEMA-1329-DR; FEMA 3154-EM.
Accor ingly, a taxpayer who sustained a loss attributable to
the disasters may deduct the loss on his or her 1999 federal
income tax return.
ITEMIZED DEDUCTIONS . The taxpayer won $858 in
a lottery, although the taxpayer had a net loss from
gambling over the tax year. The taxpayer filed an income
tax return, claiming the standard deduction and $858 in
gambling losses. The taxpayer agreed that the taxpayer was
not in the business of gambling. The court held that
gambling losses were allowed only to the extent of
winnings and only if the taxpayer claimed itemized
ded ctions instead of the standard deduction. Torpie v.
Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2000-168.
INTEREST ON TAXES AND REFUNDS. The IRS has
issued procedures for application of the zero interest rate,
under I.R.C. § 6621(d), when there are overlapping periods
of underpayment and overpayment of taxes. Rev. Proc.
2000-26, I.R.B. 2000-__.
PASSIVE ACTIVITY LOSSES . The taxpayer was the
sole shareholder of two C corporations which owned
commercial buildings. One corporation leased its building
t  a third party and realized a net loss for the tax year. The
ther corporation leased its building to the shareholder’s
law firm and realized net income for the tax year. The
taxpayer offset the income and loss as both passive items.
The IRS applied Treas. Reg. § 1.469-2(f)(6) to
recharacterize the income as nonpassive, preventing offset
against the passive loss. The court upheld the regulation as
valid, citing Schwalbach v. Comm’r, 111 T.C. 215 1998).
Krukowski v. Comm’r, 114 T.C. No. 25 (2000).
PENSION PLANS. For plans beginning in May 2000,
the weighted average is 6.03 percent with the permissible
range of 5.41 to 6.32 percent (90 to 106 percent permissible
range) and 5.41 to 6.62 percent (90 to 110 percent
permissible range) for purposes of determining the full
funding limitation under I.R.C. § 412(c)(7).  Notice 2000-
27, I.R.B. 2000-27, 1116.
The taxpayer was a family farm corporation which
adopted an ESOP defined contribution plan. The plan had
the same person as the trustee and only participant, the
president of the taxpayer. Instead of paying the president
wages for managing the farm, the taxpayer paid the
president as an independent contractor, with the president
reporting the income on Schedule C as a sole proprietor.
The taxpayer claimed no deduction for wages and deducted
the payments to the president as management fees. The IRS
disqualified the ESOP because the taxpayer paid no
compensation to employees. The taxpayer argued that the
management fees paid to the president were sufficient to
qualify the plan. The court held that the president was not
employed by the taxpayer but was a sole proprietor,
essentially self-employed. The court held that the
management fees did not qualify as compensation to the
president; therefore, the taxpayer could not claim any
deductions for contributions to the ESOP, which was
limited to 25 percent of the participant’s compensation.
There was no discussion of whether the president would be
considered an employee under other aspect of income tax
law. Van Roekel Farms, Inc. v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo.
2000-171.
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PREPRODUCTION EXPENSES. The taxpayer was a
corporation which operated a citrus orchard. The taxpayer
instituted advanced techniques in planting, fertilizing and
irrigating which minimized the growing period between
planting and fruit production. The taxpayer was able to
produce some fruit within two years, but not full
production. Although the taxpayer was able to produce fruit
within two years, the taxpayer did not provide evidence that
the nationwide average preproduction period for citrus fruit
was less than two years. The court found that the taxpayer
had used special and advanced techniques which were not
widely used. The IRS argued that the prohibition in I.R.C. §
263A(d)(3)(C) of citrus and almond growers from electing
out of the capitalization rules for four years indicated
Congressional intent that the preproductive period for citrus
was longer than two years. The court held that the
prohibition in I.R.C. § 263A(d)(3)(C) would be superfluous
unless the preproductive period for citrus was intended to
be at least four years. In addition, the court held that the
taxpayer failed to demonstrate that even the taxpayer’s
methods would produce a commercially viable harvest
within two years; therefore, the taxpayer was required to
capitalize the preproductive period expenses. Pelaez and
Sons, Inc. v. Comm’r, 114 T.C. No. 28 (2000).
WITHHOLDING TAXES. The taxpayer was a
professional baseball team which was required to pay back
wages under a employment settlement. The employees who
received the payments did not work for the team in the year
the back wages were paid. The court held that, under
Bowman v. United States, 824 F.2d 528 (6th Cir. 1987), the
wages were taxable only as to the years the wages were
earned, not when they were paid. The case is designated as
not for publication. Cleveland Indians Baseball Co. v.
United States, 2000-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,469 (6th
Cir. 2000).
NUISANCE
FLOODING . The defendant and predecessors in interest
had owned and operated a cranberry bog since the mid-
nineteenth century. After the plaintiff purchased a
neighboring farm, the water level in the cranberry bog was
maintained at a steady level by means of an outlet dam. The
plaintiff brought a private nuisance action, claiming that the
operation of the bog increased the flooding of the plaintiff’s
property. The court held that the nuisance action was
properly dismissed because the plaintiff failed to
demonstrate that the increased flooding was caused by the
bog. The trial court evidence included testimony of a
neighbor who had excavated part of the neighbor’s land,
changing the drainage of the area. Zink v Khwaja, 608
N.W.2d 394 (Wis. Ct. App. 2000).
SECURED TRANSACTIONS
PRIORITY . The plaintiff sold cattle to the defendant and
received payment in the form of drafts against the
defendant/buyer’s line of credit. The line of credit was with
a farm credit bank which had perfected a security interest in
all cattl  owned and acquired by the defendant. The bank
declared the line of credit in default before honoring the
drafts. The plaintiff sought replevin of the cattle but the
b nk argued that it had a priority security interest in the
cattle because the plaintiff did not perfect a security interest
in the cattle. The trial court had ruled that the plaintiff and
defendan  had established a course of conduct that title to
the cattle would not pass to the defendant until payment
w s made. The appellate court held that any reservation of
titl  by the seller was restricted, under Neb. U.C.C. § 2-401,
to reservation of a security interest. In addition, the bank, as
a security interest holder, became a good faith purchaser of
the cattle eligible to receive title to the cattle. Because the
plaintiff failed to perfect the security interest, the bank’s
perfect d security interest had priority. Maryott v. Oconto
Cattle Co., 607 N.W.2d 820 (Neb. 2000).
WATER LAW
GOVERNMENTAL APPROPRIATION . The
Minidoka National Wildlife Refuge was established by the
United States in 1915. Within the boundaries of the refuge
are the Smith Springs which flow through the refuge and on
to a reservoir. The United States filed a claim for 1.16 cubic
feet per second for non-consumptive beneficial use of the
refuge wildlife. The beneficial use did not require any
physical diversion of water and no physical diversions were
constructed in the refuge. The Snake River Basin
Adjudication Court granted the appropriation as a
constitutional appropriation. Under the Idaho doctrine of
constitutional appropriation, a water right may be
established by merely diverting water and putting it to a
beneficial use. The court recognized two exceptions to the
diversion requirement established by Idaho courts: (1)
where the water is used for stock watering and (2) state
entities which make nondiversionary appropriations for
state citizens under the state permit system. The court held
that the constitutional appropriation method was not
available to the United States because neither exception
applied. The court held that wildlife was not livestock. The
court held that the second exception did not apply because
the United States did not obtain a state permit for the water
use. State v. United States, 996 P.2d 806 (Idaho 2000).
CITATION UPDATES
In re Bossert, 204 F.3d 888 (9th Cir. 2000), rev’g, 230
B.R. 172 (E.D. Wash. 1999), aff’g, 201 B.R. 553 (Bankr.
E.D. Wash. 1996) (discharge of post-petition interest), see
p. 51 supra.
Top of Iowa Co-op. v. Sime Farms, Inc., 608 N.W.2d
454 (Iowa 2000) (hedge-to-arrive contracts) see p. 59
supra.
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The Agricultural Law Press presents
AGRICULTURAL TAX AND LAW SEMINAR
IN NEW MEXICO
by Neil E. Harl and Roger A. McEowen
August 16-19, 2000 Inn of the Mountain Gods, Mescalero, NM
Come join us for a world-class seminar on the hottest topics in agricultural tax and law. Space is limited for this wonderful
opportunity to gain expert insight into agricultural law and enjoy the many activities offered by this splendid resort. The resort is
very busy at this time of year, so make your reservations early.
The seminar will be Wednesday, Thursday, Friday and Saturday, August 16-19, 2000 at the Inn of the Mountain Gods resort in the
south central mountains of New Mexico. Registrants may attend one, two, three or all four days, with separate pricing for each
combination. On Wednesday, Dr. Harl will speak about farm and ranch income tax. On Thursday, Dr. Harl will cover farm and
ranch estate tax. On Friday, Roger McEowen will cover farm and ranch business planning. On Saturday, Roger McEowen will cover
current developments in several other areas of agricultural law. Your registration fee includes comprehensive annotated seminar
materials for the days attended which will be updated just prior to the seminar. The seminar materials will also be available on CD-
ROM for a small additional charge. Continental buffet breakfasts and break refreshments are also included in the registration fee.
Here are some of the major topics to be covered:
• Taxation of debt, taxation of bankruptcy, the latest on SE tax of rental of land to a family-owned entity; income averaging; earned
income credit; commodity futures transactions; paying wages in kind.
• Federal estate tax, including 15-year installment payment of federal estate tax, co-ownership discounts, alternate valuation date,
special use valuation, family-owned business deduction (FOBD), handling life insurance, marital deduction planning, disclaimers,
planning to minimize tax over deaths of both spouses, and generation skipping transfer tax.
• Gifts and federal gift tax, including problems with future interests, handling estate freezes, and “hidden” gifts.
• Income tax aspects of property transfer, including income in respect of decedent, installment sales, private annuities, self-
canceling installment notes, and part gift/part sale transactions.
• Organizing the farm business--one entity or two, corporations, general and limited partnerships and limited liability companies.
• Legal developments in farm contracts, secured transactions, bankruptcy, real property, water law, torts, and environmental law.
Special room discounts are available at the resort. The resort features a variety of splendid guest accommodations and activities,
including horseback riding, golf, sailing, hiking, tennis, fishing, and swimming.
The seminar registration fees  for current subscribers    to the Agricultural Law Digest, the Agricultural Law Manual, or Principles of
Agricultural Law are $175 (one day), $340 (two days), $490 (three days), and $620 (four days).  The registration fees for
nonsubscribers    are $195, $380, $550 and $700 respectively. Please Note: the registration fees are higher for registrations within 30
days prior to the seminar. A registration form is available online at www.agrilawpress.com
For more information, call/fax Robert Achenbach at 1-541-302-1958, or e-mail at robert@agr awpress.com
